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ABSTRACT 
When it comes to inspections in invasive species management, the literature has shown that there is frequently a tension 
between economic cost reduction and inspection stringency. As such, we analyze the properties of two probabilistic 
inspection regimes that are designed to screen arriving ships in a seaport for the presence of one or more deleterious 
invasive species. In the first regime, the seaport inspector screens arriving ships by using fast (less stringent) and slow 
(more stringent) protocols. In the second regime, the inspector uses a uniformly stringent protocol with stages. We use 
the theory of continuous time Markov chains (CTMCs) to delineate both inspection regimes. Next, we derive some key 
long run performance measures associated with each of these two regimes. Finally, we discuss the implications of our 
analysis for practical invasive species management. 
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1. Introduction 
In addition to cargo, ships frequently carry a whole host 
of invasive—also known as alien, exotic, or non-na- 
tive—animal and plant species from one part of the 
world to another. There are many ways in which ships 
carry invasive animal and plant species from one region 
of the world to another. For instance, marine invasive 
species have been introduced accidentally into a region 
by ships dumping their ballast water. Cargo ships com- 
monly carry ballast water in order to enhance vessel sta- 
bility when they are not carrying full loads. When these 
ships come into a seaport, this ballast water must be re- 
leased before cargo can be loaded. This means of inva- 
sive species introductions is salient and Yang and Perakis 
[1], Batabyal et al. [2], and Batabyal and Beladi [3] have 
now studied the problem of managing invasive species 
that have been introduced into a particular region by 
means of the jettisoning of ballast water. 
Containers are commonly used on ships to carry cargo 
from one nation to another and these containers are fre- 
quently the source for the unintentional introduction of 
one or more invasive species. Such introductions take 
place because invasive species can remain hidden in 
containers for long periods of time. In addition, sub-  
stances such as wood—often used to pack cargo in con- 
tainers—may themselves contain invasive species. In this 
regard, Batabyal and Nijkamp [4] note that a joint report 
from the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS), and the United States Forest Service (USFS) 
shows that nearly 51.8% of maritime shipments contain 
solid wood packing substances and that infection rates 
for solid wood packing substances are substantial. This 
same report goes on to state that inspections of wooden 
spools from China revealed infection rates between 22% 
and 24% and inspections of braces for granite blocks 
imported into Canada were found to hold live insects 
32% of the time [5, pp. 27-28].  
From the standpoint of a manager in a seaport, there 
are a number of actions that this individual can take to 
address the problem of biological invasions. These ac- 
tions are typically pre-invasion or post-invasion in nature. 
The objective of pre-invasion actions is to prevent inva- 
sive species from invading a new habitat. In contrast, 
post-invasion actions involve the optimal control of an 
invasive species, given that this species has already in- 
vaded a new habitat. Inspections are a basic pre-invasion 
tool that is available to managers interested in precluding 
biological invasions. They are routinely used in sea-  
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ports—and in airports and land border crossings as 
well—to screen the container cargo on arriving ships in a 
seaport. Given the significance of inspections, several 
researchers have now formally studied inspections in the 
context of invasive species management.  
McAusland and Costello [6] show that when one takes 
an intertemporal view and considers the future effects of 
current species introductions, one is naturally led to favor 
more stringent inspections. Ameden et al. [7] study bor- 
der enforcement and firm responses in a theoretical 
model of invasive species management. They demon- 
strate that increased inspections are likely to result in a 
decrease of both shipments and due care by importers. 
Batabyal and Yoo [8] analyze a random inspection 
scheme and compute the average total fines that will be 
collected by an inspector who uses this scheme to screen 
arriving ships for the presence of one or more invasive 
species.  
Batabyal [9] studies inspections in a scenario in which 
a seaport inspector places equal weight on biological 
invasion damage control and on economic cost reduction. 
In particular, he notes that the optimal dependability and 
speed of inspections is the solution to a particular long 
run expected net cost (LRENC) minimization problem. 
Merel and Carter [10] show that the import risk from 
invasive species is usefully handled with inspections. 
Specifically, when inspection costs are relatively low, a 
penalty on contaminated imports is likely to be superior 
to a simple tariff designed to diminish the overall volume 
of trade. Sanchirico et al. [11] point to the ways in which 
inspections are useful in managing invasive species when 
these inspections are a single policy tool in a package 
consisting of other policy tools as well. 
The three studies that are closest to the present paper 
are De Angelo et al. [12,13] and Batabyal [14]. De An- 
gelo et al. [12,13] concentrate on the twin objectives of 
reducing the economic cost associated with inspections 
and on diminishing the likelihood of one or more bio- 
logical invasions. These authors contend that an inspec- 
tor who places a relatively large (small) weight on inva- 
sion damage control will, ceteris paribus, want to inspect 
ships more (less) stringently. Batabyal [14] studies the 
behavior of a risk loving inspector who is more con- 
cerned about reducing the economic cost associated with 
inspections than he is about biological invasion damage 
control.  
We depart from the studies discussed above and ana- 
lyze inspections in invasive species management in a 
completely different way. Specifically, we analyze the 
properties of two probabilistic inspection regimes that 
are designed to screen arriving ships in a stylized seaport 
for the presence of one or more detrimental invasive spe- 
cies. In the first or the fast-slow inspection regime, the 
seaport inspector screens arriving ships by using a fast  
(less stringent) and a slow (more stringent) protocol. In 
the second or the uniform inspection regime, the in- 
spector uses a uniformly stringent protocol with stages. 
We use the theory of continuous time Markov chains 
(CTMCs)1 to delineate both inspection regimes. Next, we 
derive some key long run performance measures associ- 
ated with each of these two inspection regimes. Finally, 
we discuss the implications of our analysis for practical 
invasive species management. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 first uses the theory of CTMCs to provide a detailed 
description of the fast-slow inspection regime. Next, this 
Section computes three long run performance measures 
for this inspection regime and then discusses their prac- 
tical relevance. Similarly, Section 3 first uses the theory 
of CTMCs to provide a detailed delineation of the uni- 
form inspection regime with stages. Next, this Section 
calculates four long run performance metrics for this 
inspection regime and then comments on their practical 
usefulness. Section 4 concludes and then offers sugges- 
tions for future research on the subject of this paper. 
2. The Fast-Slow Inspection Regime 
2.1. Preliminaries 
Ships carrying container cargo arrive at the seaport in a 
particular geographical region of a nation in accordance 
with a stationary Poisson process with time independent 
rate λ > 0. The inspector in charge of conducting inspec- 
tions of arriving ships in this seaport has access to fast 
(less stringent) and slow (more stringent) inspection pro- 
tocols. An arriving ship that finds both protocols in use is 
“rejected” in the sense that it cannot be inspected right 
away but must wait in a queue.  
The seaport inspector has hierarchical preferences as 
far as the temporal stringency of inspections is concerned. 
Specifically, what this means is that unless both inspec- 
tion protocols are in use, the fast protocol is assigned to 
an arriving ship. The slow protocol is assigned to an ar- 
riving ship only when the fast protocol is unavailable. 
The time it takes to complete the inspection of a ship 
with the fast (slow) protocol is exponentially distributed 
with positive mean 1/β1 (1/β2). It is not possible for our 
inspector to switch between the fast and the slow inspec-
tion protocols.  
To proceed further, let Z(t) denote the state of the 
fast-slow inspection regime at any time t. As far as the 
state space of Z(t) is concerned, there are four cases to 
consider. We shall say that the inspection regime is in 
state (0,0) if the fast and the slow protocols are both not 
in use. We shall say that the regime is in state (1,0) if the 
fast protocol is in use but the slow protocol is not. We  
1See Ross [15, pp. 231-294] or Tijms [16, pp. 141-186] for textbook 
expositions of continuous time Markov chains (CTMCs). 
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shall say that the regime is in state (0,1) if the slow pro- 
tocol is in use but the fast protocol is not. Finally, we 
shall say that the regime is in state (1,1) if both fast and 
slow protocols are in use. Now, from our model, the state 
space specification, and the discussion in Tijms [16] it 
follows that the stochastic process {Z(t)} is a CTMC. 
Our next task is to compute three long run, i.e., as time 
, performance measures for this CTMC model of 
the fast-slow inspection regime. 
2.2. Three Performance Measures 
We begin by specifying the so called equilibrium prob- 
abilities2. To this end, let p(i,j) be the equilibrium prob- 
ability of state (i,j). Then, the relevant equilibrium equa- 
tions for our CTMC model of the fast-slow inspection 
regime are given by  
     1 20,0 1,0 0,1 ,p p p           (1) 
      1 21,0 0,0 1,1 ,p p p      

     (2) 
    2 10,1 1,1p p             (3) 
and 
      1 2 1,1 1,0 0,1 ,p p p            (4) 
with the normalizing equation 
       0,0 1,0 0,1 1,1 1p p p p          (5) 
With Equations (1)-(5) in place, we are now in a posi-
tion to compute the three performance measures for the 
fast-slow inspection regime.  
The first two performance measures that we are inter- 
ested in calculating concern the long run fraction of time 
that the fast and the slow inspection protocols are used. 
To undertake this calculation, recall the description of the 
four states in the last paragraph of Section 2.1. For the 
fast protocol, the states of interest are (1,0) and (1,1). 
Now, using the equilibrium probabilities specified in 
Equations (1)-(5) above and the properties of CTMCs3, 
we deduce that the long run fraction of time our seaport 
inspector uses the fast protocol is    1,0 1,1p p . 
Moving to the slow protocol, the relevant states of inter- 
est now are (0,1) and (1,1). Once again, using the equi- 
librium probabilities, the long run fraction of time our 
seaport inspector uses the slow protocol is given by 
.    0,1 1,1p p
Recall from Section 2.1 that an arriving ship in the 
seaport under study that finds both protocols in use is 
“rejected” in the sense that it cannot be inspected right 
away but must wait in a queue. As such, it is of consi- 
derable interest to determine the long run fraction of all 
ships that cannot be inspected upon arrival but must wait 
to be inspected. To compute this fraction, we shall use 
the “Poisson arrivals see time averages” or PASTA 
property4. This property tells us that the long run fraction 
of time a stochastic system is in a particular state is equal 
to the long run fraction of arriving ships that find the 
stochastic system in this same state. The state of interest 
is (1,1). A simple application of the PASTA property 
now tells us that the long run fraction of all ships that are 
“rejected” and hence must wait is equal to the equilib- 
rium probability p(1,1).  
The three performance measures computed in the pre- 
ceding two paragraphs can help our seaport inspector 
conduct the inspection function in conformity with his 
hierarchical preferences. For instance, as in Batabyal [14], 
suppose that our seaport manager is more concerned 
about reducing the economic cost associated with inspec- 
tions than he is about biological invasion damage control. 
Then, he will want to dispense with inspections relatively 
quickly and this, in turn, means that he will choose  1 2,   to increase the fraction of time that the fast in- 
spection protocol is used. Put differently, he will raise the 
sum    0 1,1p p1,  In contrast, relative to economic 
cost reduction, if this individual is more worried about 
one or more biological invasions then he will attempt to 
conduct inspections relatively slowly. This means that he 
will attempt to select  1 2,   to increase the fraction of 
time that the slow inspection protocol is used. Finally, 
the equilibrium probability p(1,1) provides our seaport 
inspector with a measure of the efficiency with which he 
is conducting his screening duties. We now proceed to 
discuss the uniform inspection regime. 
3. The Uniform Inspection Regime 
3.1. Preliminaries 
As in Section 2.1, once again ships carrying container 
cargo arrive at the seaport under study in accordance 
with a stationary Poisson process with time invariant rate 
0  . However, this time, our seaport inspector uses a 
uniform protocol with stages to screen arriving ships. 
The time it takes to complete inspections is exponentially 
distributed with positive mean 1   and only one ship 
can go through an inspection stage at any point in time. 
The matter of the “rejection” of ships discussed in 
Section 2.1 is now handled a little differently. The sea- 
port inspector now uses the following access control rule 
to determine when a ship is allowed in the seaport imme- 
diately for inspection. Specifically, a newly arriving ship 
is accepted for inspection as long as less than U other 
ships are present in the uniform inspection protocol with 
stages. As soon as the number of ships in the inspection 
protocol has dropped to u, newly arriving ships are again 
admitted into the uniform inspection protocol. The non-  
2See Tijms [16, pp. 149-153] for a textbook account of these probabili-
ties. 
3See Tijms [16, pp. 147-157] for additional details. 
4See Tijms [16, pp. 53-58] for a textbook treatment of the PASTA 
property. 
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negative integers (u,U) are given to the seaport inspector 
and we suppose that 0 ≤ u < U holds. 
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To proceed further, let Z1(t) denote the number of 
ships in the seaport under study at any time t. Let Z2(t) 
equal 1 if the seaport inspector’s uniform protocol is ac-
cepting new ships for inspection and let Z2(t) equal 0 
otherwise. We are interested in the stochastic process     1 2,Z t Z t . Now, from our model stipulation thus far 
and from the commentary in Tijms [16] it follows that 
the stochastic process     1 2, Z t Z t  is a CTMC with 
state space given by  
     ,1 0,1, ,0  1, , 1S i i i i u UU     
.
 (6) 
Our next task is to compute four performance metrics 
for this CTMC model of the uniform inspection regime. 
3.2. Four Performance Metrics 
As in Section 2.2, we begin with the equilibrium prob- 
abilities. Let p(i,j) denote the equilibrium probability of 
state (i,j). These equilibrium probabilities are obtained 
using the flow rate equation method. This method in- 
volves equating the rate out of state (i,j) to the rate into 
state (i,j).5 Our first performance metric is the long run 
fraction of time the uniform inspection protocol is idle. 
The reader will note that this fraction is given by the 
equilibrium probability p(0,1). 
Consistent with the third performance measure com- 
puted in Section 2.2, the second performance metric we 
are interested in calculating now is the long run fraction 
of all arriving ships in our seaport that are “rejected” in 
the sense that they are not inspected right away. To cal- 
culate this fraction, we shall use the state space given in 
Equation (6) and the previously described PASTA prop- 
erty. Because Poisson arrivals see time averages, we in- 
fer that the long run fraction of all arriving ships that are 
rejected is given by 
 11Long run rejected ships LRRS ,0 .i Ui u p i      (7) 
The third performance metric we are interested in cal- 
culating is the long run average number of ships that are 
waiting to be inspected in the seaport under study. The 
key point to understand now is that this third perform- 
ance metric is identical to the long run number of cus- 
tomers in a queue at time t as . In the queuing 
theory literature6, this metric is often denoted by Lq. To 
determine Lq in our case, we will need to weight the 
equilibrium probabilities p(i,1) and p(i,0) in an appropri-  
t 
ate manner and then sum the resulting expression. Once 
again, keeping the state space described by Equation (6) 
in mind, we obtain the metric we seek. Specifically, we 
get  
       11 1
Long run average waiting ships
1 ,1 1 ,0i U i Uq i i uL i p i i p i
  
         (8) 
The fourth and final performance metric we are inter- 
ested in calculating is the long run average delay in 
queue per ship that has been accepted for inspection. As 
in the computation of the third performance metric, once 
again, we use a queuing theoretic relationship. In this 
case, the salient point to note is that the fourth perform- 
ance metric we seek is the same as the long run average 
delay in queue per customer. In the queuing theory lit- 
erature, this delay is frequently denoted by Wq. Now, 
adapting equation 2.3.1 in Tijms [16, p. 51] to our prob-
lem, it is clear that the long run average delay in queue 
per ship that has been accepted for inspection or 
  1q qW L LRRS  . Making the appropriate sub-
stitutions from Equations (7) and (8), we get 
       
  
1
1 1
1
1
Long run average delay
1 ,1 1 ,0
1 ,0
i U i U
i i u
q i U
i u
i p i i p i
W
p i
  
  
 
 
        
 
     
(9) 
From the standpoint of practical invasive species ma- 
nagement, the four performance metrics computed in this 
Section can help our seaport inspector in three key ways. 
First, our seaport manager can choose one or more of the 
quantities  , ,u U  to optimize the performance met-
rics we have derived thus far in this Section. In this re-
gard, the long run fraction of all arriving ships that are 
rejected (Equation (7)) and the long run average delay in 
queue per ship that has been accepted for inspection 
(Equation (9)) are likely to be key performance metrics 
that our seaport inspector would like to minimize. Our 
analysis shows that this inspector can, inter alia, choose 
U to minimize either Equation (7) or (9). 
Second and more generally, our seaport manager can 
use one or more of the four performance metrics we have 
derived to set up and maximize a net social benefit from 
inspections objective function. In this case, one or more 
of the four performance metrics derived in this Section 
would make up the more general net social benefit crite- 
rion function and the choice variables would be one or 
more of the quantities  , ,u U . 
Finally, instead of using one or more of the four per- 
formance metrics directly for the purpose of optimization, 
the seaport manager can also solve a constrained optimi- 
zation problem where one or more of this Section’s per- 
formance metrics enters the optimization problem as a 
constraint. In this way of looking at the screening func- 
tion, the seaport inspector would attempt to ensure that 
the expression in Equation (9), for instance, is no bigger 
than some acceptable upper bound or threshold. This 
completes our discussion of the properties of two prob- 
5See Ross [15, pp. 251-257] or Tijms [14, pp. 147-154] for textbook 
discussions of this method. 
6See Tijms [16, pp. 50-53] for additional details on this point and on 
the prominent formula of Little. 
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abilistic inspection regimes in the context of invasive 
species management. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyzed the properties of two prob- 
abilistic inspection regimes that were designed to screen 
arriving ships in a seaport for the presence of one or 
more deleterious invasive species. In the first regime, the 
seaport inspector screened arriving ships by using a fast 
(less stringent) and a slow (more stringent) protocol. In 
the second regime, the inspector used a uniformly strin- 
gent protocol with stages. We used the theory of CTMCs 
to describe the two inspection regimes. Next, we derived 
some key long run performance measures associated with 
each of these two inspection regimes. Finally, we dis- 
cussed in detail the implications of our analysis for prac- 
tical invasive species management.  
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number 
of directions. Here are two possible extensions. First, to 
account for the fact that ships are more likely to arrive at 
the seaport under study at certain times than at others, 
one could model the ship arrival process with a non-sta- 
tionary Poisson process with a time dependent intensity 
function given by, for instance, . Second, from 
the vantage point of the efficient allocation of inspection 
resources, it would be useful to set up—possibly with 
one or more constraints—and then solve an optimization 
problem of the sort discussed towards the end of Section 
3.2. Research on inspections as a tool for managing 
deleterious invasive species that incorporate these as- 
pects of the problem into the analysis will provide addi- 
tional insights into a management problem that has con- 
siderable economic and ecological ramifications. 
  0t 
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